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Abstract
The mechanism behind the emergence of cooperation in both biological and social systems is currently
not understood. In particular, human behavior in the Ultimatum game is almost always irrational,
preferring mutualistic sharing strategies, while chimpanzees act rationally and selfishly. However, human
behavior varies with geographic and cultural differences leading to distinct behaviors. In this letter, we
analyze a social imitation model that incorporates internal energy caches (e.g., food/money savings), cost
of living, death, and reproduction. We show that when imitation (and death) occurs, a natural correlation
between selfishness and cost of living emerges. However, in all societies that do not collapse, non-Nash
sharing strategies emerge as the de facto result of imitation. We compare the model to results from
a meta-analysis on geographically diverse ultimatum game studies in humans, and show the proposed
model captures many of the qualitative aspects of the real-world data.
1 Introduction
Cooperation is critical for the emergence of societies (e.g., ants, cetaceans, humans etc.). However cooperation
is frequently an irrational response to an environment with a cost of living. Consequently, understanding
and modeling the mechanism of the emergence of cooperation and fairness is still an active area of research
in social and biological theory [1–12]. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an archetypal game illustrating both
the difficulties in modeling concepts of fairness and cooperation. In the game, one player is given a sum of
money which she must divide in some proportion between herself and a second player. The second player
may then accept the offer, in which case the pot is divided accordingly, or reject the offer in which case each
player receives nothing [13]. This is like a continuous variation of the Stag-Hunt game, in which individual
gain competes against mutual benefit. The notional money can act as a stand-in for a cooperative hunt,
business venture etc. Here we introduce an additional UG variable, individual wealth, which drives the
dynamic imitate the successful.
A considerable amount of theoretical and experimental research has been done on the ultimatum game
(see e.g., [14–24]). Classical game theory asserts the most rational, sub-game perfect solution is for the
dividing player to keep as much of the prize as possible, while the deciding player accepts any offer. However,
almost all experiments with humans (but not chimpanzees [19]) show that individuals will offer far more than
the minimum quantity and deciding players will frequently reject offers at the expense of their own well-being
(presumably as an act of punishment for unfair or non-cooperative behavior). In particular, Oosterbeek et
al. conducted a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from various countries [16], and concluded that
there is not a significant difference in proposers’ behavior, but there is a difference in responders’ behaviors
across (geographic) regions. Any model of UG dynamics should include elements observed in their meta-
study: (i) it must produce a diversity of results that can be tuned to explain geographic diversity; (ii) it
should explain why offers show less variation than rejection rates; (iii) it should be generally consistent with
human behavior.
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Mathematical models by Nowak et al. approach the Ultimatum Game from an evolutionary game theory
perspective, by including the reputation of agents as part of the offer making process [25] and in a one-shot
game context [26]. More recently, Gale et al. construct a discrete strategy evolutionary game representation
[13], and show that evolutionary stable strategies exist in this game. In addition to this, a substantial amount
of work has been done on spatial ultimatum games [27–30].
2 Model
Our proposed model is an agent-based simulation following the spirit of [25, 26], similar to the approach
taken in [31, 32]. We introduce a dynamic wealth variable [33] for each player, as an integrated measure of
success. In our model, agents interact randomly and each interaction is an instance of UG with a possible
prize P . Agents are chosen at random to be the offerer or decider. The state of agent i is specified by
internal variables (λi, θi, Bi) where λi ∈ [0, 1] is the fairness (cooperation) demanded by Agent i, θi ∈ [0, 1]
is the offer provided by Agent i and Bi > 0 is the energy cache (bank) held by each agent, which keeps
track of the winnings (energy) from each interaction. Energy loss in the system is set by the cost of living
parameter κ, which is subtracted at each time step from the energy cache of each player.
If Agents i and j interact and i is the offerer, then Agent j rejects the offer whenever θi < λj . In the
case of acceptance, Agent i keeps (1 − θi)P and Agent j keeps θiP . When P = 1, then all parameters can
be expressed as ratios of P . Let χij(t) be an indicator function that is 1 at time t exactly when i and j
interact. The discrete time agent-based model dynamics are given by:
Bi(t+ ) = Bi +

2
∑
j 6=i
χij(t)P
(
1− θi)U(θi − λj) + 
2
∑
j 6=i
χij(t)Pθ
jU
(
θj − λi)− κ, (1)
where
U(x) =
{
1 if x > 0
0 otherwise
is the unit step function, and we take κ ∈ [0, 1]. For simulation purposes, we set  = 1. Taking the expected
value of these equations, a mean-field approximation of the agent energy dynamics can be derived:
∆Bˆ(t) =

2q
∑
j 6=i
[(
1− θi)U (θi − λj)+ θjU (θj − λi)]− κ, (2)
The normalizing value q is given by:
q =
{
n n is odd
n− 1 otherwise ,
which models the random choice of two agents from a completely connected population of n agents. We next
propose dynamics that drive the population towards a statistical equilibrium (θi, λi) → (λ∗, θ∗). However,
independent of any game dynamics for the population, we can already derive certain relations that charac-
terize the dynamics of the energy cache B using Eq. (2). If λ∗ > θ∗, then U(θ∗ − λ∗) = 0 and ∆Bˆ < 0.
Populations of this type will collapse. On the other hand, if λ∗ < θ∗, then as n→∞:
∆Bˆ(t) =

2
(1− 2κ) , (3)
which also holds in general for even n. Thus, if κ > 12 , the population will collapse in the mean. For κ =
1
2 ,
the population energy caches will stabilize in the mean and for κ < 12 , the population energy caches will
increase without bound.
In discrete time, the dynamics of (θ, λ) are given by:
λi(t+ ) = λi(t) + 
∑
j 6=i
(λj − λi)pij (4)
θi(t+ ) = θi(t) + 
∑
j 6=i
(θj − θi)pij , (5)
2
where pij are imitation probabilities. Let:
Qi =
∑
j
U(Bj −Bi), (6)
this is the cumulative difference in energy values for all agents j with Bj > Bi. For the discrete time
simulation, we set:
pij =
{
(Bj−Bi)U(Bj−Bi)∑
h(B
h−Bi)U(Bh−Bi) if Q
i > 0
0 otherwise
(7)
Eqs. (4) and (5) are imitation dynamics in which agents imitate those who outperform them. Thus Agent j
does not rationally choose (λj , θj), but adjusts these values based on observations weighted towards other,
more successful agents. Our model is based on recent research showing that children will imitate higher
status individuals more selectively than lower status individuals [34]. Additionally, children will infer status
based on observing imitation in adults [35]. Lastly, [36] shows that in strategic settings humans will imitate
behavior based on pay-off inequality.
For imitation systems like Eqs. (4) and (5), Griffin et al. proved that a sufficient condition for convergence
is the emergence of a fixed leader i∗ imitated (directly or indirectly) by all agents [37], which readily occurs
in this system as a result of the total ordering of Bi. As  → 0, Eqs. (4) and (5) become the continuous
time consensus equations as surveyed in [38], but with a state-varying coefficients. The proof of convergence
in [37] for discrete time updates suggests that exact values of pij are irrelevant, as long as Agent i is imitating
those agents who outperform it.
Whether in continuous or discrete dynamics, these systems have an infinite set of fixed points θk = θ∗,
λk = λ∗ for θ∗, λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]. It is clear that not all such fixed points are equally likely or even realistic,
since all systems with λ∗ > θ∗ would lead to population collapse for any cost of living κ > 0. Therefore, the
distributions of long-run behavior in these systems should provide insights into the emergence of cooperative
or fair behaviors.
We assume agents are initialized with θk and λk uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Again consider the case
when n→∞. From Eq. (2) the expected per-round energy increase near t = 0 for an agent with parameters
(θ, λ) is:
∆B(θ, λ) =
1
2
∫ θ
0
(1− θ) dλ+ 1
2
∫ 1
λ
θ dθ − κ = 1
2
(1− θ)θ + 1
2
(
1
2
− λ
2
2
)
− κ. (8)
Maximizing this expression subject to the constraints 0 ≤ θ, λ ≤ 1, suggests the optimal fairness demand is
λ+ = 0, while the best offer is θ+ = 12 . This is consistent with the classical Nash equilibrium (λ
+ = 0) but
also consistent with fairness considerations (θ+ = 12 ), since an agent can never be certain whether she will
interact with an agent with high or low λ. If the players were perfectly rational, then a true Nash equilibrium
would be θNE = λNE = 0, since rational players realizing λ+ = λNE = 0 would make θNE = 0. From Eq. (8),
when κ > 38 , the expected increase for even an optimal player is negative. This will lead to a mean decrease
in energy caches until imitation leads to higher success rates in UG. Let χ∆B(θ, λ, κ) be an indicator function
that is 1 just in case, Eq. (8) is positive. Numerical evaluation shows that when κ∗ ≈ 0.26246:∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
χ∆B(θ, λ, κ
∗) dλ dθ = 12 .
For κ > κ∗, the median energy cache value will decrease in early interactions before imitation can contract
the strategy space. Individuals whose energy cache reaches zero are assumed dead and can no longer interact
in the system. Reproduction or replacement of players is used to maintain a constant population, and the
specific rule we use is described in the simulation details below.
3 Simulation Results
We simulate a population with N agents. Agents are initialized with an energy cache value Bi, and uniformly
randomly assigned values θi and λi. Agents enter a game loop, where each agent plays UG with another
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randomly selected agent. Once all agents have played, energy caches are updated accordingly. In the agent-
based simulation, we introduce a reproductive step into the mimicking process to account for agents with
non-positive energy cache and to identify population collapse prior to convergence. If all agents have Bi < 0
after subtracting the cost of living, the simulation ends immediately. Otherwise, all agents with Bi > 0,
mimic others using Eqs. (4) and (5) in a mimic/reproduce loop. If all agents have survived, agents return to
the game loop. Otherwise, agents are randomly chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to their
energy cache; i.e., the fittest reproduce with higher probability. Reproduction continues until the population
reaches N . If the population never collapses, the process is terminated after T rounds. The size of T is
chosen to ensure convergence. To ensure numerical validity, the model was implemented both in Python and
Mathematica, and results were compared to ensure statistical consistency.
Fig. 1 shows simulation results for N = 150 players, T = 300 and all agent energy caches initially set
to 1 using 100 replications. Distribution plots for B, θ and λ are shown, with cost of living κ ranging from
0.05 to 0.5. Density plots showing the joint (θ, λ) distributions are shown in Fig. 2. The simulation shows
downward pressure on the offer value as a result of the energy cost of living κ with consistent values of λ∗
between (approximately) 0.1 and 0.4. The general range of results can be explained by the fact that in each
round for the surviving population, imitation contracts the interval [0, 1] into itself, therefore at any given
time, the optimal play is adjusted by changing the bounds on the integrals in Eq. (8). This leads to the
optimal strategy:
θ+(t) = min
{
1 + mink λ
k(t)
2
,max
k
λk(t)
}
(9)
λ+(t) = min
k
θk(t). (10)
There is downward pressure on λ, which may decrease over time (as min θk increases). Thus, low values of
λ∗ are consistent with Eq. (10), but the downward pressure on θ as a function of κ cannot be explained by
Eq. (9). This trend however can be explained by considering the contraction of the strategy space caused by
Eqs. (4) and (5). At a given time t, let λmin(t) and λmax(t) be the minimal and maximal values of λ
k, and
let θmin(t) and θmax(t) be the minimal and maximal values of θ
k. For simplicity we assume the contraction
caused by Eqs. (4) and (5) maintains the uniform distribution of the λk and θk. Then modifying Eq. (8),
the expected payoff is:
∆Bˆ(θ, λ;λmin, λmax, θmin, θmax, κ) =
− κ+

(1−θ)(θ−λmin)
2(λmax−λmin) λmin ≤ θ ≤ λmax
1−θ
2 θ > λmax
0 otherwise
+

θ2max−λ2
4(θmax−θmin) θmin ≤ λ ≤ θmax
θmax+θmin
2 λ < θmin
0 otherwise.
(11)
To better understand the system dynamics in the offer-demand (θ, λ) plane, we define the set S of these
variables for which there is expected increase in energy (∆Bˆ > 0):
Sκ(λmin, λmax, θmin, θmax) =
{
(θ, λ) : ∆Bˆ(θ, λ;λmin, λmax, θmin, θmax, κ) > 0
}
This set is asymmetric around θ = 0.5, as illustrated in Fig. 3, with the asymmetry becoming more pro-
nounced for larger κ.
The asymmetry in Sκ(λmin, λmax, θmin, θmax) implies that the individuals with large energy caches are
more likely to have lower values of θ for larger values of κ, thus increasing the likelihood they are imitated.
The relative constant distribution of λ (see Fig. 1 (middle)) is explained by the λ independence of Sκ for
values below some critical fairness demand.
The dynamics of the energy cache values can be modeled asymptotically. As t → ∞, λmin = λmax and
θmin = θmax for non-collapsing populations, thus from Eq. (3), the energy caches of each agent asymptotically
approaches:
Bi(t) = ( 12 − κ)t.
This model is shown in Fig. 1 (bottom). This over-estimates the long-run energy cache value because of the
initial time taken to converge. We can approximate the trend seen in Fig. 1 (bottom), by noting that the time
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Figure 1: Simulation results using 150 agents, 300 rounds of play, and 100 replications: (top) there is a well
defined negative correlation between cost of living and offer; (middle) Fairness demands are stable across
cost of living values; (bottom) energy cache values follow an empirical trend derivable from the model.
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Figure 2: Density plots show the distributions of (θ∗, λ∗) over multiple replications with varying costs of
living.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Offer (θ)
Fa
irn
es
s
D
em
an
d
(λ)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Offer (θ)
Fa
irn
es
s
D
em
an
d
(λ)
Figure 3: Asymmetry in the set Sκ(λmin, λmax, θmin, θmax) around θ = 0.5 explains downward pressure on
θ∗, shown for λmin = 0.1, λmax = 0.4, θmin = 0.3, θmax = 0.6, and: (Left) κ = 0.1; (Right) κ = 0.4.
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for λmin, λmax, θmin and θmax to converge so that most UG interactions are successful in approximately 100
rounds (out of the 300 rounds simulated). Assuming that prior to convergence, only half of all interactions
result in a successful UG, we obtain a thermodynamic-type relationship between the mean wealth of the
population and the cost of living:
B˜(κ) = 250
(
1
2
− κ
)
,
which explains the linear decrease with κ shown in Fig. 1 (bottom).
Figure 4 shows the a log-plot of mean deaths per capita per simulation with notional cubic fit. As
expected, there is a non-linear jump for κ = 12 . In addition, we note tht the zero-crossing (corresponding to
one death per round) occurs roughly at κ = κ∗, representing a transition in the population to a more rapidly
increasing per capita death rate with cost of living κ. This also correlates with more than 50% of the agents
having initially decreasing energy caches, thus increasing the per capita death rate.
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Figure 4: Log-Log plot of per capita death rate in the simulation as a function of energy cost of living.
The global dynamics displayed in Fig. 1 are robust to changes in the speed of the underlying dynamics. In
particular, we tested models in which (i) we replaced the discrete dynamics with continuous time differential
equations (by letting  → 0), (ii) an Euler step approximation of the resulting differential equations and
(iii) a heterogenous starting energy cache value with the previously described dynamics. The ODE variants
model fast imitation (on the time scale of the game play). In all cases except one, we included reproduction
as a hybrid step by solving the ODEs for short time horizons, checking for death and then restarting the
ODEs from the previous condition after removing agents with Bk < 0. All models used 100 replications
except when reproduction was eliminated in which case 200 replications were used to ensure statistically
signifiant sample sizes. (Samples with population collapse were discarded.)
Results from robustness experiments are shown in Fig. 5 (top), where we show the mean values θ¯∗. The
envelopes are 1σ. Similar tests were run for λ¯∗ (omitted for space). For all cases, θ¯ is decreasing in κ. The
mean fit line has negative slope as a function of κ (p = 5.1 × 10−6) and adjusted r2 of 0.95, consistent
with prior results and theoretical analysis. There is a difference in the behavior of λ¯∗ for the the discrete
time simulations and the continuous time (hybrid) variations. In the case of the hybrid ODE models (with
or without Euler step approximations) λ¯∗ increases as a function of κ (p < 0.002) while for discrete step
simulations λ¯∗ decreases as a function of κ (p < 0.002). When the data are combined, λ¯∗ increases as a
function of κ but with p < 0.004, suggesting this effect may disappear with larger samples. This would be
the expected behavior as indicated by Fig. 3.
4 Comparison to Human Experiments
The proposed model provides behavior consistent with observations in the meta-study by Oosterbeek et al.
[16] insofar as a diversity of offer proportions and rejection rates are shown to be possible as a result of random
interaction and imitation of multiple agents. Over all simulations, the grand mean 〈θ〉 = 0.43±0.00032, which
is consistent with the 40.41% offer rate observed in [16]. The grand mean 〈λ〉 = 0.20 ± 0.00026, implying
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Figure 5: (top) Model variations show the same trend in offer as a function of cost of living. (bottom)
Scaling GDP as a proxy for cost of living in real-world data shows good correlation with the proposed model
(number in parentheses denotes the number of countries averaged in each data point [16]).
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that 20% of offers would be rejected if chosen uniformly randomly from [0, 1]. [16] reports a mean rejection
rate of 16%, which is consistent with the results produced by the model assuming some cultural learning
(imitation) has occurred. As noted, the distributions describing λ∗ have ranges from approximately 0.1 to 0.4,
adequately modeling the large variation in rejection rates. Despite these similarities, we cannot fully validate
the model because neither [16] nor its constituent studies include a variable like cost of living. Their study
does regress against GDP and reward as a percent of per capita GDP (which spans 2 orders of magnitude),
but this is not an accurate measurement of intrinsic cost of living, especially in geographically diverse areas
like the United States. We note that in [16], regression of offer against GDP shows an insignificant negative
correlation, which is consistent with Fig. 1 and Fig. 5 (top), but these studies were not designed to measure
this relationship. However, when we use the mean offer data from [16] and organize it by region of the
world (as was done in their meta-study), we can construct a median offer trend line as a function of GDP
for cost of living which, when linearly scaled into our [0, 0.5] range for κ, shows a downward trend that is
exceptionally similar to our proposed model (see Fig. 5 (bottom)). Note that we exclude data from the United
States since it spanned multiple states with substantially different true costs of living [16]. We also note that
samples from South America are not adequately explained by our model. Nonetheless, this surprisingly good
correlation suggests further experimentation is warranted to validate the hypothesized relationship between
cost of living (∼ environmental stress) and behavior in the ultimatum game.
5 Conclusion
Game Theory finds application in biological and social sciences, yet well-known occurrences like cooperation
and altruism remain challenging within its rational self-interest assumptions. Our paper presents a novel
approach to the canonical Ultimatum Game (UG), introducing an additional savings variable (energy) along
with a cost of living. In our nonlinear agent-based model, energy represents success and drives imitation.
Agents evolve toward fair sharing, but are more selfish with higher costs of living, with consistently lower
fairness demands of others. The model reproduces empirical data of human UG performance across cultures,
providing a new theoretical framework for heterogenous cooperation among humans. In future work, we may
explore these dynamics further to determine whether the exact structure of the distributions on θ and λ can
be determined.
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